Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a mathematical programming method for measuring the relative efficiency of Decision Making Units (DMUs) by evaluating their outputs and inputs. In the history of DEA, the cross-efficiency of jth DMU is widely used as an efficiency measure of a given DMU o among researchers. The approach always utilizes weights related to inputs and outputs in the assessment. Unfortunately, the weights are not always uniquely determined in the cross-efficiency measurement because DEA always suffers from an occurrence of multiple solutions, so indicating an occurrence of multiple weights. To overcome such a difficulty, this paper proposes a new approach for determining a common weight vector of DEA based on bargaining game.
, DMU o is defined as inefficient. Hence, Model (1) can be usually solved by two steps of optimization without providing a specific value to ε, which is a non-Archimedean infinitesimal (Cooper et al., 2006) . This study extends the discussion by using this radial model under constant RTS. The radial model is expressed as: 
The cross-efficiencies are simply the ratios in the constraints of Model (3). The cross-efficiencies are easily summarized by an n n matrix, whose (o,j) component is oj E . Sexton et al. (1986) called it as cross-efficiency matrix. The conventional efficiency measures exist on the diagonal of the cross-efficiency matrix.
By examining the row o of the cross-efficiency matrix, this study can identify how DMU o rates each of the other DMUs, that is, how efficient each of the other DMUs is when an optimal weights generated by DMU o are used for its measurement. The mean efficiency in the row o (including the diagonal) is called
. The measure indicates the average efficiency of all DMUs according to DMU o . In a similar manner, this study can examine the column j of the cross-efficiency matrix to identify how DMU j is rated by each of the other DMUs when it is evaluated by means of the optimal weights that they are generated. The mean efficiency in the column j (including the diagonal) is
. The measure indicates the average efficiency of DMU j according to all other DMUs. They can compute the average of all the cross-efficiency values, or EBAR. However, there may be no common weights of the cross-efficiency because DEA always suffers from an occurrence of multiple solutions.
The accommodated total efficiency was proposed by Sugiyama and Yamada (2001) . They showed that the accommodated total efficiency is a general form for the cross-efficiency. The accommodated total efficiencies of DMUs are calculated from the following three steps. (a) In the first step, they evaluate the relative efficiencies of DMUs as group members. (b) In the second step, the mutual evaluation information of DMUs can be defined and calculated by using their weights. They indicate the mutual evaluation information by a form of matrix which they called it as "Accommodation Efficiency Matrix." It is widely known that the weights are not always uniquely determined. The mutual evaluation information is not uniquely determined. Here, they have proposed a method for determining the weights uniquely by minimizing square of the weights differences. (c) In the third step, they calculate the accommodated total efficiency which is the group efficiencies of DMUs by using the maximum eigenvalue of "Accommodation Efficiency Matrix."
A Common Weight Vector by the Bargaining Game Approach
This section defines some feasible sets of bargaining game on DEA and proposes the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution by using those feasible sets. There are various descriptions about the bargaining game, and many articles. See, for example, Peters (1992) and Thomson (1994) . The study of DEA with the Game theory can be found in Banker, Charnes, Cooper and Clarke (1989) , Semple (1996) , Hao, Wei and Yan (2000) , Nakabayashi and Tone (2006) , and etc. On the other hand, Du, Liang, Chen, Cook and Zhu (2011) described DEA on the bargaining game. A Nash bargaining game has also been proposed for measuring the performance of a two-stage network DEA system.
The Bargaining Game
, this study denotes the set of players. The bargaining game (Peters, 1992, and Thomson, 1994 ) is defined by a pair of   d , S . The players in N try to reach a unanimous agreement on some outcome S  η , yielding utility k  for player k. If they fail, the disagreement outcome or disagreement point d occurs in the game. The set S is referred to as a feasible set of the bargaining game. The set S needs to be convex, bounded and closed. There is at least one point of S strictly dominating d.
This study chooses one of the bargaining solutions by applying an axiomatic approach. In the axiomatic approach, the typical solution on the bargaining game is the Nash bargaining solution (Thomson, 1994) . The Nash bargaining solution is a single solution on the feasible set S satisfying Pareto-optimality, symmetry, scale invariance and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Here, a solution of the proposed bargaining game on DEA satisfies Pareto-optimality, symmetry and scale invariance. However, the solution of the bargaining game on DEA may not satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Therefore, the Nash bargaining solution is not appropriate. The rationale is because a DEA-efficiency score is a relative evaluation score.
Meanwhile, a DEA solution of the proposed bargaining game fully satisfies individual monotonicity. The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Thomson, 1994 ) is the only solution on a feasible set S satisfying Pareto-optimality, symmetry, scale invariance and individual monotonicity. Consequently, this study selects the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
These axioms are described in research efforts (i.e., Peters, 1992, and Thomson, 1994) . The definition of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Thomson, 1994 ) is specified as follows. 
[In another definition,
3.2 The Feasible Set S of the Bargaining Game on DEA Let the players be DMUs. Consequently, the number of the players is n. In addition, game situations assume the bargaining game. Then, this study generalizes a feasible set of bargaining game on DEA. The feasible set in a correlated pure strategy is expressed as follows: Here, it is expected that the feasible set in correlated pure strategy P S is a convex set. However, it is difficult to prove whether P S is a convex set because 
The Computational Mode for Bargaining Solution
Let the ideal point of S be each DMU's efficiency score The maximization of Model (7) is an unbounded problem. Thus, the maximization problem form, modified by adding the equation 1  j vx , becomes: 
Here, this study can set the ideal point of S be an each DMU's efficiency score. Furthermore, it is possible to set the disagreement point d as the origin.
Numerical Example
This section documents the productivity analysis of Japanese electric power industry by applying the proposed approach. This example was given in Sugiyama and Yamada (2001) .
Data
The subjects of analysis are nine electric power companies in Japan. This study utilizes the management indexes, given below, as input/output data of each company in the fiscal year 1991. The data source is "Hand Book of Electric Power Industry '91" (Statistics Committee of Electric Utilities Association (Ed.), 1992), in the form of Table 1 .
[Input/Output Items]
Inputs: x 1j "Number of Employees", x 2j "Maximum Generation Capacity" and x 3j "Total Assets".
Outputs : y 1j "Electricity Sales" and y 2j "Number of Customers". 
Analysis and Evaluation
First, DEA is appiled on the nine electric power companies as DMUs. Table 6 indicates the results obtained from the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and conventional approaches. The accommodated total efficiencies of each DMU were given in Sugiyama and Yamada (2001) , as well. Furthermore, the cross-efficiencies (ECOL(j)) of each DMU were calculated by using the weights determined uniquely in Sugiyama and Yamada (2001) . The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution satisfies Pareto-optimality, symmetry, scale invariance and individual monotonicity, thus the result obtained from the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution may be more useful for a group decision making than other efficiencies. Therefore, each DMU may be able to accept the solution more easily.
Fourth, Table 7 indicates a common weight vector obtained from each approach. Here, the weights of the accommodated total efficiency were given in Sugiyama and Yamada (2001) , as well. There were not the weights satisfying the cross-efficiency in the feasible set of DEA-solutions. Hence, these weights were not calculated in this study. 
